

Online Appendix

Who Pays for Crime? Criminal Violence and Accountability in Latin America

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
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Appendix A: Evidence from PELA

We also provide evidence from the Observatorio de Elites Parlamentarias Latinoamericanas (PELA) project to show that right-wing legislators are more likely than non-right-wing legislators to focus on security.


Figure A1 is based on answers to the following question: “Consider these different areas of public spending. Please tell me which areas should receive more funding given their importance for the country’s development?” (Policy areas mentioned: infrastructure, health, citizen security, education, defense, housing, pensions/social security, the environment). The figure shows the percentage of legislators who mentioned “citizen security” as one the two areas requiring more funding. It is worth restating that the PAN in Mexico and the RN and UDI in Chile are right-wing parties.

Figure A1. Percentage of legislators who want to increase funding for citizen security



Appendix B: Evidence from Mexican Panel Studies


Figure A2. Percentage of survey respondents who perceive presidential candidates as able to fight crime in Mexico (average by party for three presidential elections: 2000, 2006, 2012).



Appendix C: Evidence from Chile

In a survey implemented three months before the 2017 presidential elections in Chile, Visconti (2018) shows how respondents can connect policy preferences with ideological labels. Figure A3 replicates Visconti's (2018) Figure 1b, which indicates answers to the following question: do you associate the use of iron-fist policies with certain politicians?

Figure A3. Iron-fist crime-reduction policies and politicians' ideological labels in Chile



The results show that a majority of survey respondents associated right-wing politicians with the use of strong-handed policies for combatting crime.

Appendix D: Data

In the case of Chile, we use the following variables at the municipality level:

Total population: Total number of inhabitants according to the 2002 Census. We use a natural logarithm transformation.

Income index: Gross income per capita, as calculated by the United Nations Development Program in 2003.

Education index: Mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling, as calculated by the United Nations Development Program in 2003.

Crime rates: Total number of crimes divided by the total population twelve months before the 2005, 2009, and 2013 presidential elections. We focus on the criminology category called “crimes of greater social connotation,” which corresponds to offenses including burglary, thefts, homicides, and rape. Data was obtained from the *Centro de Estudio y Análisis del Delito*, which sits under the Undersecretary of Crime Prevention.

Outcome: Change in the incumbent vote share. We calculated this variable using data from the *Servicio Electoral de Chile*.

In the case of Mexico, we use the following variables at the municipality level:

Total population: Total number of inhabitants according to the CONAPO (*Consejo Nacional de Población*). For the 2000 presidential election, we use data from 1995; for the 2006 election, data from 2000; and for the 2012 election, data from 2010.

Marginalization index: This indicator measures socioeconomic marginalization by creating an index using four dimensions: education, housing, rurality, and income. This index was calculated by the CONAPO. For the 2000 presidential election, we use data from 1995; for the 2006 election, data from 2000; and for the 2012 election, data from 2010.

Illiteracy: Percentage of the population older than 15 that is illiterate. This data was obtained by the CONAPO. For the 2000 presidential election, we use data from 1995; for the 2006 election, data from 2000; and for the 2012 election, data from 2010.

Crime rates: Total homicides divided by total population twelve months before the 2000, 2006, and 2012 presidential elections. Crime data was obtained from the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI).

Outcome: Changes in the incumbent vote share. We calculated this variables using data from the *Instituto Federal Electoral* (IFE).

Appendix E: Regression Models

Table A1 displays the impact of a crime shock on the change in the incumbent vote share in Chile. In the case of this country, the treatment has a negative effect on the vote share of the incumbent party from one presidential election to the next when the incumbent president does not belong to a right-wing party (β_1). However, that effect disappears when there is a right-wing incumbent (β_3). In sum, voters do not punish right-wing incumbents for crime shocks at the local level. In the first column, we provide results using the four covariates (natural logarithm of total population, income index, education index, and crime rates). In subsequent columns, we decrease the covariates one by one to illustrate the stability of the results across different specifications.

Table A1. Electoral data results (Chile)

	Change in incumbent vote share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Crime shock (β_1)	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.023* (0.012)
Crime shock*Right-wing president (β_3)	0.038* (0.022)	0.038* (0.022)	0.038* (0.022)	0.038* (0.022)
N	1336	1336	1336	1336
Covariates	4	3	2	1
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Variables not shown: right-wing president indicator and covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A2 shows a similar pattern in Mexico. Voters punish non-right incumbents for failures in the provision of public security, a negative effect that disappears when the incumbent belongs to a right-wing party. Again, a homicide shock reduces the vote share of non-right-wing incumbents by two points from one presidential election to the next, but that negative effect vanishes for right-wing presidents.

Table A2. Electoral data results (Mexico)

	Change in incumbent vote share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Crime shock (β_1)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.021** (0.010)
Crime shock*Right-wing president (β_3)	0.035*** (0.013)	0.035*** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.013)
N	4090	4090	4090	4090
Covariates	4	3	2	1
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Variables not shown: right-wing president indicator and covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A3 summarizes the main results for the external validity approach. The coefficient for victimization corresponds to the effect of exposure to crime when there is a non-right-wing president. Victimized respondents are almost four percentage points less likely to vote again for a non-right-wing incumbent candidate or party (β_1). The interaction represents the change in effect of a crime shock between a non-right-wing and a right-wing president. This result shows that the punishment for crime disappears when there is a right-wing incumbent (β_3).

Table A3. Survey data results (18 Latin American countries)

	Voting (again) for the incumbent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Victimization (β_1)	-0.039*** (0.008)	-0.037*** (0.008)	-0.041*** (0.008)
Victimization*Right-wing president (β_3)	0.036** (0.018)	0.036** (0.018)	0.036** (0.018)
N	39208	39208	39208
Countries	18	18	18
Covariates	3	2	1
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Variables not shown: right-wing president indicator and covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Appendix F: Sensitivity Analyses

Table A4 shows the replication of the main analysis in Chile, but using an increase in crime between the third and the fourth quarter greater than 5 percentage points to identify a crime shock (instead of greater than 10 percentage points).

Table A4. Chile 5%

	Change in incumbent vote share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Crime shock (β_1)	-0.022* (0.009)	-0.022* (0.009)	-0.022* (0.009)	-0.022* (0.009)
Crime shock*Right-wing president (β_3)	0.027*** (0.013)	0.027*** (0.013)	0.027*** (0.013)	0.027*** (0.013)
N	1336	1336	1336	1336
Covariates	4	3	2	1
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Variables not shown: right-wing president indicator and covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In Table A5 we replicate the main analysis in Chile, but now using an increase in crime between the third and the fourth quarter greater than 15 percentage points to identify a crime shock (instead of greater than 10 percentage points).

Table A5. Chile 15%

	Change in incumbent vote share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Crime shock (β_1)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.016)
Crime shock*Right-wing president (β_3)	0.033 (0.027)	0.033 (0.027)	0.033 (0.027)	0.033 (0.027)
N	1336	1336	1336	1336
Covariates	4	3	2	1
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Variables not shown: right-wing president indicator and covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table A6 we replicate the main analysis in Mexico, but now using an increase in crime between the third and the fourth quarter greater than 5 percentage points to identify a crime shock (instead of greater than 10 percentage points).

Table A6. Mexico 5%

	Change in incumbent vote share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Crime shock (β_1)	-0.021* (0.010)	-0.021* (0.010)	-0.020* (0.010)	-0.020* (0.010)
Crime shock*Right-wing president (β_3)	0.034*** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.013)	0.033*** (0.013)	0.032*** (0.013)
N	4090	4090	4090	4090
Covariates	4	3	2	1
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Variables not shown: right-wing president indicator and covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table A7 we replicate the main analysis in Mexico, but now using an increase in crime between the third and the fourth quarter greater than 15 percentage points to identify a crime shock (instead of greater than 10 percentage points).

Table A7. Mexico 15%

	Change in incumbent vote share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Crime shock (β_1)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.022** (0.011)
Crime shock*Right-wing president (β_3)	0.038*** (0.014)	0.038*** (0.014)	0.037*** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.014)
N	4090	4090	4090	4090
Covariates	4	3	2	1
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Variables not shown: right-wing president indicator and covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The results are the same as in the manuscript. In the case of Table A5, the interaction term is not statistically significant because of the small size of the treatment group, which increases the size of the standard errors. In the case of Mexico, we do not have this problem because we have a much larger sample size. Chile only has 345 municipalities, while Mexico has 2458.

Appendix E: Participation

In Table A8 we explore whether crime victimization affects electoral participation. We construct a binary outcome where 1 is reporting to vote for the incumbent, for a challenger, or leaving the ballot blank; and 0 is saying not to vote. We use the same LAPOP data used for the external validity analysis. We do not find evidence that exposure to crime modifies victims' willingness to turn out.

Table A8. Survey data on participation (18 Latin American countries)

	Participation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Victimization (β_1)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Victimization*Right-wing president (β_3)	0.004 (0.014)	0.004 (0.014)	0.004 (0.014)
N	33929	33929	33929
Countries	18	18	18
Covariates	3	2	1
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Variables not shown: right-wing president indicator and covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Appendix G: Perceptions

In Table A9 we replace crime victimization with perceptions of insecurity. We construct the independent variable using the following question from LAPOP: speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe. The evidence shows that perceptions about insecurity do reduce the likelihood of voting for non-right-wing incumbents. However, the results show that there is a significant difference between non-right and right-wing incumbents. Specifically, the negative effect of perceptions about insecurity is smaller for the latter. It is worth restating that our analysis excludes by design respondents who will always report negative perceptions because they do not like the current administration.

Table A9. Survey data on perceptions (18 Latin American countries)

	Voting (again) for the incumbent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Perceptions of insecurity (β_1)	-0.032*** (0.003)	-0.032*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)
Perceptions of insecurity*Right-wing president (β_3)	0.031** (0.007)	0.031** (0.007)	0.031** (0.007)
N	39006	39006	39006
Countries	18	18	18
Covariates	3	2	1
Municipality Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Variables not shown: right-wing president indicator and covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

References

Visconti, Giancarlo. 2018. "Re-evaluating the Role of Ideology in Chile." Working paper, Purdue University: http://www.giancarlovisconti.com/pdfs/Visconti.2019.Chile_ideology.pdf.