

Online Appendix

## **Immigration Shocks and (Mis)Concerns about Crime: Evidence from Chile<sup>1</sup>**

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
<sup>1</sup> We thank Sarah Goldberg, Michael Touchton, Amy Erica Smith, Lindsay Mayka, SPSA 2020 and APSA 2020 seminar participants for useful comments and suggestion. Soledad Araya provided excellent research assistance.

<sup>2</sup> Assistant professor, California State University, Dominguez Hills, email: fseverino@csudh.edu.


<sup>3</sup> Assistant professor, Purdue University, email: gviscont@purdue.edu.

## Appendix A: Alternative measure of exposure

As an alternative approach, rather than using immigration shocks, we use the change in percentage points between year 1 and year 2 before the survey to evaluate its impact of concerns about crime and crime rates. When using this approach, we do not remove units such as when using immigration shocks and relying on an extreme dose approach.<sup>4</sup> The main conclusions of the study are the same regardless of using immigration changes between year 1 and year 2 (rather than immigration shocks) or using all the units (rather than an extreme doses approach).



**Figure A1:** Impact of immigration change on concerns about crime




**Figure A2:** Impact of immigration change on crime rates


<sup>4</sup> Observations all visas: 12,690, observations Haiti: 6,829, observations Venezuela: 8,533.

## Appendix B: Robustness check individual level data


As a robustness check, we change the cutoff to identify exposed and control municipalities. In the main manuscript we use one standard deviation above the mean as the decisive criteria. In this section we use ten alternative cutoffs (1.05, 1.04, 1.03, 1.02, 1.01, 0.99, 0.98, 0.97, 0.96, and 0.95 standard deviations above the mean). We use these new indicators of exposure to check the effects of immigration shocks on concerns about crime. The conclusions of our study are not affected when using alternative cutoffs.




**Figure A3:** Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime (1.01 standard deviation)




**Figure A4:** Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime (1.02 standard deviation)




**Figure A5:** Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime (1.03 standard deviation)




**Figure A6:** Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime (1.04 standard deviation)




**Figure A7:** Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime (1.05 standard deviation)




**Figure A8:** Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime (0.99 standard deviation)




**Figure A9:** Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime (0.98 standard deviation)



**Figure A10:** Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime (0.97 standard deviation)




**Figure A11:** Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime (0.96 standard deviation)




**Figure A12:** Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime (0.95 standard deviation)

### Appendix C: Robustness check county level data


As in the previous section, we change the cutoff to identify exposed and control municipalities. We use these new indicators of exposure to check the effects of immigration shocks on crime rates. The conclusions of our study are not affected when using alternative cutoffs.




**Figure A13:** Impact of immigration shocks on crime rates (1.01 standard deviation)



**Figure A14:** Impact of immigration shocks on crime rates (1.02 standard deviation)




**Figure A15:** Impact of immigration shocks on crime rates (1.03 standard deviation)




**Figure A16:** Impact of immigration shocks on crime rates (1.04 standard deviation)







**Figure A17:** Impact of immigration shocks on crime rates (1.05 standard deviation)




**Figure A18:** Impact of immigration shocks on crime rates (0.99 standard deviation)




**Figure A19:** Impact of immigration shocks on crime rates (0.98 standard deviation)



**Figure A20:** Impact of immigration shocks on crime rates (0.97 standard deviation)



**Figure A21:** Impact of immigration shocks on crime rates (0.96 standard deviation)



**Figure A22:** Impact of immigration shocks on crime rates (0.95 standard deviation)

## Appendix D: Effects of immigration shocks from other countries

We also provide the effects of immigration shocks of people from other Latin American countries with high levels of migrants such as Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. We do not find evidence that they increase concerns about crime.




Figure A23: Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime




Figure A24: Impact of immigration shocks on concerns about crime rates

## Appendix E: Main results

In figure 1 we have the following results (effect of immigration shocks on concerns about crime): in the case of “All” visas the result is -0.019 [95% CI: -0.090, 0.052], for Haiti 0.1244 [95% CI: 0.010, 0.239], and for Venezuela -0.033 [95% CI: -0.114, 0.048].

In figure 2a, we have the following results (effect of immigration shocks on crime rates 6 months after): in the case of “All” visas the result is 4.65 [95% CI: -74.631, 83.933], for Haiti - 107.8907 [95% CI: -327.650, 111.869], and for Venezuela 62.365 [95% CI: -127.440, 252.170].

In figure 2b, we have the following results (effect of immigration shocks on crime rates 12 months after): in the case of “All” visas the result is -23.363 [95% CI: -0.090, 0.052], for Haiti -230.798 [95% CI: 0.010, 0.239], and for Venezuela 107.425 [95% CI: -0.114, 0.048].

In figure 2c, we have the following results (effect of immigration shocks on crime rates 18 months after): in the case of “All” visas the result is -94.364 [95% CI: -333.082, 144.353], for Haiti - 358.927 [95% CI: -988.127, 270.272], and for Venezuela 139.438 [95% CI: -404.443, 683.319].

In figure 2d, we have the following results (effect of immigration shocks on crime rates 24 months after): in the case of “All” visas the result is -135.563 [95% CI: -449.190, 178.064], for Haiti - 470.418 [95% CI: -1300.423, 359.587], and for Venezuela 178.702 [95% CI: -535.391, 892.796].