

# **Supplementary Appendix: Causes and Consequences of Ideological Persistence: The Case of Chile**

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# 1 Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables




Figure A1: Distribution of Ideology  
Source: Netquest panel. Number of unique observations: 1,065




Figure A2: Priority Issues Over Time (1994-2023)  
Source: CEP Number of observations: 85,993




Figure A3: Distribution of Ideology  
Source: Netquest panel. Number of unique observations: 1,065

Direction of the Change	Percentage
Left ↔ Right	0.7
Center ↔ Left	5.0
Center ↔ Right	7.9
Center ↔ Independent	9.7
Independent ↔ Left	3.3
Independent ↔ Right	2.6
<b>Total Any Change</b>	<b>29.1</b>
Always Left	20.0
Always Right	18.2
Always Center	16.9
Always Independent	15.8
<b>Total No Change</b>	<b>70.9</b>

Table A1: Change in Ideological Positions 2021-2023 Among Same Respondents  
Source: Netquest panel. Number of unique observations: 1,065

An important note about the table above: it summarizes the persistence of ideological stances and also shows the existence of fluidity in a smaller segment of the population. However, that fluidity should not be overestimated, as a third of it is explained by movements between the center and independents—categories that have some conceptual overlap.

Variable	Center	Independent	Left	Right	Total
I would never vote for the right	13.2	9.4	63.3	1.8	22
I would never vote for the left	12.8	10.2	0.9	65.2	21
I could vote for either the right or the left	74	80.4	35.7	57	223.2

Source: Netquest panel. Number of unique observations: 3,965.




Figure A4: Should the state nationalize the main companies?

Source: Netquest. Number of unique observations: 1,065

Attribute	Candidate 1		Candidate 2	
Ideology	Left		Right	
Gender	Man		Woman	
Age	40		50	
Feminism	Consider himself a feminist		Does not consider herself a feminist	
Immigration	Propose new entry restrictions		Does not propose new entry restrictions	
Crime	Propose harsher punishments		Does not propose harsher punishments	

Table A2: Example of two profiles

Ideology	Issues	
	Immigration	
	Pro	Anti
<b>As self-identification</b>	Left	N=496
	Right	N=490
<b>As preferences over issues</b>	Left	N=390
	Right	N=301

Table A3: Description of Subsamples

Vote	Left	Center	Right	Total
<b>Approve</b>	85.6	36.5	4.4	39.91
<b>Rejection</b>	9.1	48	84.9	45.9
<b>Don't Know</b>	5.3	15.5	10.7	14.2
<b>Total</b>	208	304	159	1065

Table A4: Cross Tabulation Vote on 2022 Referendum by Ideology




Figure A5: Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) Interaction Ideology\*Immigration among Right and Anti-Immigration Subsample

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




Figure A6: Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) Interaction Ideology\*Immigration among Right and Anti-Immigration Subsample

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




Figure A7: Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) Interaction Ideology\*Immigration among Left and Pro-Immigration Subsample

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




Figure A8: Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) Interaction Ideology\*Immigration among Left and Pro-Immigration Subsample

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




Figure A9: Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) All Attributes and Whole Sample  
 The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 30,075 (3,075 survey participants).

Vote	Left	Center	Right	Total
Gabriel Boric	92.3	42.1	6.3	44.7
José Antonio Kast	1.5	29	79.9	34.3
Don't Know	6.3	29	13.8	21
Total	208	304	159	1065

Table A5: Cross Tabulation Vote on 2021 Election by Ideology




Figure A10: Marginal Means All Attributes and Whole Sample

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 30,075 (3,075 survey participants).




Figure A11: Interaction between Ideology and Issues

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted. Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations left, pro-immigration subsample: 3,900 (390 survey participants). Number of observations right, anti-immigration subsample: 3,010 (301 survey participants).

## 2 Appendix B: Robustness Checks

### Ideology versus Alternative Issues

In Table B1, we see the level of agreement with the assertion that the government should increase jail time for criminals. The first thing that stands out is that most respondents agree with the assertion (90.1%), suggesting that most Chileans have a “tough-on-crime” position. Second, even if there is some ideological divide, 81.9% of people identified with the left agree with the statement. In this sense, even if we typically associate though-on-crime policies with the right, it is safe to assert that this position is shared by Chileans regardless of ideology.

	Left	Right	Total
Strongly Agree + Agree (%)	81.9	96.6	90.9
Neutral + Disagree + Strongly Disagree (%)	18.1	3.4	9.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>764</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>3,065</b>

Table B1: Attitudes Toward Crime by Ideology

The statement reads: “Do you agree with increasing jail time for criminals.” The percentages displayed are the column percentages. For simplicity, we omitted centrists and respondents who do not identify with an ideology on the left-right scale.

Using this survey question, we engage in a similar exercise as before: we identify two new subsamples: right-wing and tough-on-crime people and leftists tough-on-crime. Then, we estimated regression models, focusing on the impact of the interaction between ideology and the punitive approach to crime.

The findings are similar to what was found before, although some nuances exist. On the one hand, ideology still trumps the crime policy issue, both on the left and the right (Figure B1). However, in the right-wing subsample, it looks like the point estimate of the right-wing less punitive candidate is smaller compared to the leftist subsample. In this sense, there is a slightly higher proportion of respondents —especially on the right— that are willing to get across the aisle, provided that a candidate satisfies their preferences in this issue.

When looking at feminism, we find a similar result. Table B2 shows the percentage of people who declare themselves as feminists by ideology, where we see a clear difference between left and




Figure B1: Marginal Means Interaction between Ideology and Crime

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted (see Appendix A for the complete results). Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations Left and tough-on-crime subsample: 6,260 (626 survey participants). Number of observations Right and tough-on-crime subsample: 6,750 (675 survey participants).

	Left	Right	Total
Do you declare yourself a feminist? (% No)	42	85	69.9
Do you declare yourself a feminist? (% Yes)	58	15	30.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>764</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>3,065</b>

Table B2: Attitudes Towards Feminism by Ideology

The percentages displayed are the column percentages. For simplicity, we omitted centrists and respondents who do not identify with an ideology on the left-right scale.

right.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, we define two subsamples: left-wing feminists and right-wing non-feminists. When looking at the results, we observe that for the left-wing and feminist subsample, ideology is a considerably more important factor than feminism; the same applies among the right non-feminist subsample.




Figure B2: Marginal Means Interaction between Ideology and Feminism

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted (see Appendix A for the complete results). Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations Left and feminist subsample: 4,430 (43 survey participants). Number of observations Right and non-feminist subsample: 5,940 (594 survey participants).

## Ideology Against Two Issues

So far, we have confirmed that ideology clearly predominates over issue voting when comparing the marginal mean of the candidate's ideology to the preference over one issue. However, we can examine respondents' preferences when a candidate has the same ideology but the opposite view over two issues. For instance, consider a subsample of rightists, anti-immigration, and tough-on-crime respondents. Among these, we can analyze their support for candidates with an aligned

<sup>1</sup>It is important to note that feminism is a different type of policy issue. While crime and immigration are more traditional issues with specific policy implications, feminism can also be considered as part of a political identity besides just specific policy issues. As a result, this can work as a good test to compare ideology with a more identity-based type of issue.

ideology but with a misalignment over the two issues.<sup>2</sup>

Results are generally consistent with the prominence of ideology. In the left panel of Figure B3, we see that leftist respondents always prefer the ideologically aligned candidate, even if they disagree over two issues—for instance, a left-wing candidate, anti-immigration and soft on crime. For the rightist subsample, there is one exception to this trend, as they seem to prefer a left-wing candidate who aligns with them on two issues. In this sense, even if ideology seems to prevail most of the time, the evidence suggests that left-wing voters are willing to give a bit more leeway to candidates than right-wing ones.




Figure B3: Interaction between Ideology and Issues

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted (see Appendix A for the complete results). Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations left, pro-immigration, and feminist subsample: 3,170 (317 survey participants). Number of observations right, anti-immigration, and non-feminist subsample: 4,250 (425 survey participants).

<sup>2</sup>To calculate these marginal means, we estimated a model with a triple interaction: ideology, crime, and immigration.

### 3 Appendix C: Sample and External Validity

As explained in the Data and Measures section, we are using primary data from Netquest. This data is panel, and so far, we have collected three waves. The first wave included 3,965 observations; the second —which was conducted a month later—, we recontacted 3,065, whereas in the third wave (conducted in December 2023), we interviewed 1,065 individuals. The conjoint experiment was administered in the second wave. In some descriptive Figures, we use data from from waves two and three.

In the second wave, we use a sample of 3,075 respondents, which broadly mirrors the age and gender composition of the Chilean population, though it falls short in representing certain educational categories, specifically those with less than a high school and technical education background (Table C1). Consequently, we have taken measures to address these discrepancies by applying post-stratification weights, which are derived from the distribution of region, gender, education, and age combinations. Additionally, we have employed a “raking” approach to create weights, leveraging the overall distribution of these variables rather than specific cell counts.

Table C1: External Validity Netquest Sample

	% 2017 Census	% Netquest (Second Wave)
18-24	14.3	13.8
25-34	20.8	19.6
35-44	18.1	18.2
45-54	17.6	18.5
55-64	14.2	14.8
65-74	8.8	11.3
75 or more	6.3	3.8
Female	51.1	46.1
Male	48.9	53.9
Less than High School	24	4.3
High School	45	46.6
Technical	9.3	22.9
College or graduate	21.7	26.1

We use both types of weights, and re-estimate the core results of the conjoint experiment —the

ones comparing ideology versus issue voting regarding immigration. We also use it for calculating the marginal means of all attributes. The ensuing results, as depicted in Figures [C1](#), [C2](#) [C3](#), [C4](#), [C5](#) and [C6](#), show that the results are practically the same.




Figure C1: Marginal Means All Attributes Census-Based Cell Weights

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Number of observations: 30,075 (3,075 survey participants).





Figure C2: Marginal Means All Attributes Census-Based Rake Weights


The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.

Number of observations: 30,075 (3,075 survey participants).




**Figure C3: Marginal Means Ideology and Immigration Census-Based Cell Weights**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted (see Appendix A for the complete results). Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations Left and pro-immigration Subsample: 4,960 (496 survey participants). Number of observations Right and Anti-Immigration Subsample: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




**Figure C4: Marginal Means Interaction between Ideology and Issues Census-Based Cell Weights**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted (see Appendix A for the complete results). Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations Left and pro-immigration Subsample: 4,960 (496 survey participants). Number of observations Right and Anti-Immigration Subsample: 4,900 (490 survey participants).



**Figure C5: Marginal Means Ideology and Immigration Census-Based Cell Weights**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted (see Appendix A for the complete results). Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations Left and pro-immigration Subsample: 4,960 (496 survey participants). Number of observations Right and Anti-Immigration Subsample: 4,900 (490 survey participants).



**Figure C6: Marginal Means Interaction between Ideology and Issues Census-Based Cell Weights**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted (see Appendix A for the complete results). Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations Left and pro-immigration Subsample: 4,960 (496 survey participants). Number of observations Right and Anti-Immigration Subsample: 4,900 (490 survey participants).

## 4 Appendix D: Conjoint Diagnostics


We test for some potential pitfalls of a conjoint experiment. Table [D1](#) shows a balance table by regressing five demographic covariates on the conjoint attributes. In most cases, there is balance across demographics, with one exception, which can be attributed to random chance. Then, Figures [D1](#), [D2](#), [D3](#), and [D4](#) display the AMCE for both the leftists and rights subsamples, including the interaction of the order of each profile (right or left side of the screen) and the attributes of interest. We do not find evidence that the order affects the results. Finally, [D5](#), [D6](#), [D7](#), and [D8](#) display the AMCE for both the leftists and rights subsamples, including the interaction of the wave of each profile (from 1 to 5) and the attributes of interest. We have not found evidence that the wave affects the results.

	(1) NSE (ordinal)	(2) College	(3) Age	(4) Duration	(5) Sex
Ideology	0.013 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.208 (0.147)	0.075 (0.075)	0.006 (0.004)
Gender	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.031 (0.208)	-0.126 (0.104)	-0.010 (0.006)
Age	0.001 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.010 (0.127)	-0.037 (0.065)	0.002 (0.004)
Feminism	0.026* (0.015)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.173 (0.184)	0.042 (0.098)	0.016*** (0.006)
Immigration	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.187 (0.217)	0.111 (0.112)	0.001 (0.006)
Crime	0.002 (0.015)	0.000 (0.005)	0.130 (0.187)	-0.061 (0.095)	-0.008 (0.006)
Obs.	30750	30730	30750	30750	30750


\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table D1: Balance Table Key Covariates


It is possible that the days until the election would affect the results, since as the election looms, people may become more ideological. We test this by interacting days until the election with our main attributes of interest in each subsample (see Figures [D9](#), [D10](#), [D11](#), and [D12](#)). In each case,



**Figure D1: Interaction by Order in the Screen (Right and Anti-Immigration Subsample)**  
 The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




**Figure D2: Interaction by Order in the Screen (Left and Feminist Subsample)**  
 The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




**Figure D3: Interaction by Order in the Screen (Right and More Punitive Subsample)**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




**Figure D4: Interaction by Order in the Screen (Right and More Punitive Subsample)**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




**Figure D5: Interaction by Wave (Right and Anti-Immigration Subsample)**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




**Figure D6: Interaction by Wave (Left and Feminist Subsample)**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).



**Figure D7: Interaction by Wave (Right and More Punitive Subsample)**


The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




**Figure D8: Interaction by Wave (Left and More Punitive Subsample)**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).


days until the election do not change our results.



**Figure D9: Interaction by Days Until the Election (Right and Anti-Immigration Subsample)**  
The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,900 (490 survey participants).




**Figure D10: Interaction by Days Until the Election (Left and Feminist Subsample)**  
The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 4,430 (430 survey participants).



**Figure D11: Interaction by Days Until the Election (Right and More Punitive Subsample)**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 6,750 (675 survey participants).



**Figure D12: Interaction by Days Until the Election (Left and More Punitive Subsample)**

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. Coefficients represent the AMCE. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations: 6,260 (626 survey participants).

## 5 Appendix E: Ideologically Inconsistent Respondents

In this section, we follow the logic of [?](#) in their analysis of affective polarization in the US. According to their logic, to determine whether polarization is driven by loyalty to an in-group or by policy disagreement, they analyze whether partisan inconsistent people, that is, respondents who identify with a party but have one policy position that is inconsistent with most of adherents of such party, have a better perception of a co-partisan or someone who agrees with them in that specific issue. They claim that if a partisan person follows the party line in every important issue and expresses a preference for a co-partisan, there is no way to determine whether such a person is motivated by party loyalty or policy agreement. In our setting, we can make an analogous claim: if a respondent identified both with a policy position and an ideology prefers a candidate aligned in ideology instead of someone aligned on an issue, it does not necessarily imply that people care more about ideology than policy agreement. Instead, it could mean that ideological alignment signals policy agreement in a large set of issues. To adjudicate between the policy agreement versus the loyalty hypotheses, we engage in a similar exercise to the one proposed by [?](#). Among ideologically inconsistent people, we analyze whether agreement on issues matters more than agreement over ideology. If the latter holds, it would suggest subjects prefer ideological loyalty, as ideology would prevail over a policy stance that is the opposite of the in-group. In particular, we selected four new subsamples of people who are against the majority of their ideological group: leftists anti-immigration, rightists pro-immigration, leftists anti-feminists, and rightists feminists. Among these groups, we estimated the marginal means.

Figures [E1](#) and [E2](#) show the marginal means, non interacted and interacted, respectively among respondents who are ideologically inconsistent with regard to immigration. Clearly, ideological alignment continues to prevail, as respondents prefer the candidate of the same ideology instead of the one who agrees with their immigration stance. The same applies regarding the feminist issue: again, these ideologically inconsistent respondents care much more about ideological alignment (see Figures [E3](#) and [E4](#)). Thus, even in cases where respondents defy the position of their

ideological group, we observe a prevalence of ideological voting.




Figure E1: Interaction between Ideology and Issues Among Ideologically Inconsistent Respondents

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted. Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations left, anti-immigration subsample: 2,680 (268 survey participants). Number of observations right, pro immigration subsample: 2,090 (209 survey participants).




Figure E2: Interaction between Ideology and Issues Among Ideologically Inconsistent Respondents

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted. Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations left, non feminist subsample: 3,210 (321 survey participants). Number of observations right, feminists subsample: 1,050 (105 survey participants).




Figure E3: Interaction between Ideology and Issues Among Ideologically Inconsistent Respondents

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted (see Appendix A for the complete results). Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations left, pro-immigration subsample: 3,900 (390 survey participants). Number of observations right, anti-immigration subsample: 3,010 (301 survey participants).




Figure E4: Interaction between Ideology and Issues Among Ideologically Inconsistent Respondents

The outcome is the preference for a given candidate. The other conjoint attributes are omitted (see Appendix A for the complete results). Coefficients represent the marginal means. The dots represent the point estimates, and the lines 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Number of observations left, pro-immigration subsample: 3,900 (390 survey participants). Number of observations right, anti-immigration subsample: 3,010 (301 survey participants).

## 6 Appendix F: Robustness Check Topic Modeling (k=3 and k=4)

Table F1: Topic Prevalence and Representative Words (k = 3) for Open-Ended Questions on Ideological Labels

Panel A: A25A – Ideas About “the Left”			
Group	Topic	Mean Contribution	Example Words (Among Top 15)
Full Sample	Topic 1	0.369	pueblo, comunista, política, izquierda, sociales
	Topic 2	0.318	comunistas, igualdad, pobreza, gente, derechos
	Topic 3	0.313	comunismo, social, ladrones, socialismo, democracia
Left	Topic 1	0.371	social, comunismo, lucha, gente, cambios
	Topic 2	0.302	igualdad, justicia, democracia, bienestar, revolución
	Topic 3	0.326	pueblo, sociales, comunistas, comunidad, trabajador
Right	Topic 1	0.375	comunismo, socialismo, pueblo, socialistas, caos
	Topic 2	0.333	comunistas, hambre, resentidos, miseria, revolución
	Topic 3	0.292	pobreza, desorden, violencia, personas, delincuencia

Panel B: A25B – Ideas About “the Right”			
Group	Topic	Mean Contribution	Example Words (Among Top 15)
Full Sample	Topic 1	0.382	elite, empresarios, fachos, riqueza, partido
	Topic 2	0.321	ladrones, udi, democracia, poder, pinochet
	Topic 3	0.297	ricos, capitalismo, conservadores, robo, dinero
Left	Topic 1	0.331	dinero, dictadura, fascismo, pueblo, empresarios
	Topic 2	0.343	elite, conservador, udi, neoliberalismo, corrupción
	Topic 3	0.326	empresarios, ricos, capitalismo, privilegios, pinochet
Right	Topic 1	0.366	democracia, capitalismo, orden, conservador, udi
	Topic 2	0.375	progreso, libertad, trabajo, desarrollo, pueblo
	Topic 3	0.259	libertad, estabilidad, mejor, crecimiento, valores

Table F2: Topic Prevalence and Representative Words ( $k = 4$ ) for Open-Ended Questions on Ideological Labels

Panel A: A25A – Ideas About “the Left”			
Group	Topic	Mean Contribution	Example Words (Among Top 15)
Full Sample	Topic 1	0.291	pueblo, comunismo, comunista, política, ideas
	Topic 2	0.245	comunistas, igualdad, derechos, socialista, sociales
	Topic 3	0.235	pobreza, ladrones, gente, gobierno, revolución
	Topic 4	0.228	comunismo, partido, cambios, caos, progresismo
Left	Topic 1	0.291	comunismo, comunista, pobres, libertad, democracia
	Topic 2	0.264	pueblo, justicia, solidaridad, política, cambios
	Topic 3	0.244	derechos, personas, cambio, socialismo, dignidad
	Topic 4	0.201	igualdad, sociales, lucha, comunidad, trabajador
Right	Topic 1	0.288	comunismo, socialismo, pueblo, socialistas, desorden
	Topic 2	0.213	comunistas, caos, hambre, destrucción, revolución
	Topic 3	0.280	comunista, igualdad, violencia, resentidos, populista
	Topic 4	0.219	pobreza, comunismo, fracaso, derechos, política

Panel B: A25B – Ideas About “the Right”			
Group	Topic	Mean Contribution	Example Words (Among Top 15)
Full Sample	Topic 1	0.292	nose, empresarios, conservadores, derecha, extremo
	Topic 2	0.263	elite, capitalismo, ricos, democracia, libertad
	Topic 3	0.239	ladrones, corruptos, robo, gobierno, izquierdas
	Topic 4	0.206	udi, conservador, pinochet, pueblo, trabajo
Left	Topic 1	0.266	elite, dictadura, derechos, pueblo, pinochetistas
	Topic 2	0.252	dinero, ricos, solo, partido, robo
	Topic 3	0.266	privilegios, conservador, udi, fachos, facismo
	Topic 4	0.217	capitalismo, empresarios, neoliberalismo, gobierno, aprovechamiento
Right	Topic 1	0.288	capitalismo, orden, conservador, trabajo, democracia
	Topic 2	0.237	progreso, democracia, pueblo, riqueza, respeto
	Topic 3	0.259	libertad, pinochet, desarrollo, dinero, capitalistas
	Topic 4	0.216	udi, conservadores, mejor, trabajo, valores

## 7 Appendix G: Continuity Test for the RDD




Figure G1: Continuity Test using Education and Gender as Outcomes

## 8 Appendix H: Alternative Samples for RDD

For the RDD analysis, we restrict the analysis to people with birthdays within  $\pm 150$  days of October 5th, 1970, to generate a reasonable bandwidth. As a robustness check, we restrict the sample to 140, 130, 120, 110, and 100 days as additional robustness checks.




Figure H1: RDD Estimates Over Different Time Periods